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Abstract: Data anonymization is gaining much attention these days as it provides the fundamental requirements to safely
outsource datasets containing identifying information. While some techniques add noise to protect privacy
others use generalization to hide the link between sensitive and non-sensitive information or separate the
dataset into clusters to gain more utility. In the latter, often referred to as bucketization, data values are kept
intact, only the link is hidden to maximize the utility. In this paper, we showcase the limits of disassociation,
a bucketization technique that divides a set-valued dataset into km-anonymous clusters. We demonstrate that
a privacy breach might occur if the disassociated dataset is subject to a cover problem. We finally evaluate the
privacy breach using the quantitative privacy breach detection algorithm on real disassociated datasets.
1 Introduction
Privacy preservation is an important requirement that
must be considered carefully before the release of
datasets containing valuable information. Anonymiz-
ing a dataset by simply removing the personally iden-
tifying information (PII) is insufficient to prevent
a privacy breach (Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002).
An attacker1 may still succeed in associating his/her
background knowledge with one or multiple records
via non-sensitive information in the dataset to even-
tually reveal individuals’ sensitive information. The
same problem arises when releasing set-valued data
(e.g., shopping and search logs) consisting of a set
of records where each record links an individual to
his/her set of distinct items. The AOL search data
leak in 2006 (Barbaro and Zeller, 2006) is an explicit
example that shows the implications of inappropri-
ate anonymization on data privacy. The query logs
of 650k individuals were released after omitting all
explicit identifiers. They were later withdrawn due to
multiple reportings of privacy breaches.
To better illustrate the problem, let us consider a
dataset of individuals and their corresponding sets of
searched data items. Let us assume that an attacker
knows that Alice, an individual whose items figure in
publicly available dataset, has used two search items:
{SideE f f ects and Vomiting}. The attacker’s back-
ground knowledge consists of the set of these two
items. If it happens that one and only one record ex-
ists in the released dataset where both Vomiting and
SideE f f ects belong to the same itemset, such as the
case of record r1 in the example shown in Figure 1,
the attacker can link the individual Alice to r1. Here,
1a person who is intentionally trying to link individuals
to their sensitive information
the attacker, who has partial knowledge of some of
the data items searched by the individual, is able to
determine the complete itemset and link it to the cor-
responding individual.
ID Records 
r1 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer, Surgery, Side Effects, Vomiting} 
r2 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer, Surgery, Side Effects, Nausea} 
r3 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer} 
r4 {Treatment, Surgery, Side Effects, Chemotherapy} 
r5 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer} 
r6 {Oncologist, Surgery} 
(a) Original set-valued dataset
  Record chunks Item chunk 
ID C1 C2 CT 
r1 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer} {Surgery, Side Effects} 
Vomiting, 
Nausea, 
Chemotherapy 
r2 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer} {Surgery, Side Effects} 
r3 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer} 
r4 {Treatment} {Surgery, Side Effects} 
r5 {Oncologist, Treatment, Cancer}   
r6 {Oncologist} {Surgery} 
(b) Disassociated dataset with record chunks C1 and C2
Figure 1: Example scenario
There has been significant work in anonymization
(Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002; Machanavajjhala
et al., 2006; Xiao and Tao, 2006; Dwork et al., 2006;
Terrovitis et al., 2012) to cope with this problem.
Categorization, on the one hand, separates the data
into sensitive and non-sensitive categories of values,
which unfortunately can be hard to adopt in real world
applications due to the elastic meaning of the sensi-
tivity (Terrovitis et al., 2012). Generalization, on the
other hand, transforms values into a general form and
creates groups to eliminate possible linking attacks.
Despite its efficiency in privacy preservation, gener-
alization has a major drawback related to the loss in
data utility (Xiao and Tao, 2006), making it less effi-
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cient for aggregate analysis. Anonymization by dis-
association (Terrovitis et al., 2008; Loukides et al.,
2014a; Loukides et al., 2015) is one recent method
that preserves the original items keeping them intact,
without applying generalization or substitution. In-
stead, it uses some form of bucketization and sepa-
rates the records into clusters and chunks to hide their
associations. More specifically, disassociation trans-
forms the original data into km-anonymous (Terrovitis
et al., 2008) records by dividing the dataset 1) hor-
izontally, creating clusters of similar records and 2)
vertically, creating km-anonymous chunks of similar
sub-records (e.g., record chunks C1 and C2 in Figure
1b) and an item chunk containing items that appear
less than k times.
Disassociation lies under a general category of
techniques (Li et al., 2012; Xiao and Tao, 2006; Ciri-
ani et al., 2010) that preserve privacy by dividing the
dataset to maximize the utility. It provides strong the-
oretical guarantees but unfortunately remains vulner-
able when the dataset is subject to what we call a
cover problem, which is defined in Section 5.
In this article, we evaluate the privacy provided by
the disassociation of a set-valued dataset and demon-
strate that it might be breached whenever this dataset
is subject to a cover problem. We show that attack-
ers with different levels of partial background knowl-
edge weak, moderate, or strong are able to compro-
mise the privacy of a disassociated dataset. We also
show that, as many other bucketization techniques
(Xiao and Tao, 2006; Li et al., 2012) in their attempt
to protect against attribute disclosure, preserving pri-
vacy tends to be overly optimistic (Wong et al., 2011;
Kifer, 2009; al Bouna et al., 2015a; al Bouna et al.,
2015b).
The contributions of this research work can be
summarized as follows:
• We present a formal model of the set-valued data
and the disassociation technique.
• We define the cover problem and investigate its
repercussion on the disassociation of the dataset.
• We propose the so-called quantitative privacy
breach detection algorithm, and study its effi-
ciency. The proposed algorithm shows to what
extent the privacy of a disassociated dataset can
be breached.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we present prior work in data
anonymization and discuss some of the techniques
used to breach well known privacy constraints. In
Section 3, we give some insights on privacy preserv-
ing using the disassociation technique. Section 4
defines the attacker model including the three types
of attackers: strong, moderate, and weak. In Sec-
tion 5, we present the cover problem and the result-
ing privacy breach in a disassociated dataset. We fi-
nally present a set of experiments to evaluate the de-
anonymizing algorithm is presented in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Anonymization techniques have been a topic of in-
tense research in the last decade. Several have been
proposed as a way to protect privacy by guaranteeing
that the probability of linking an individual to a spe-
cific record will not be greater than a certain thresh-
old (e.g., 1/k or 1/l). Some rely on generalization
(Samarati, 2001; Sweeney, 2002; Machanavajjhala
et al., 2006); replacing some values with more gen-
eral values based on a given taxonomy or an inter-
val for numerical values, while others on bucketiza-
tion (Xiao and Tao, 2006; Ciriani et al., 2010; Biskup
et al., 2011); separating what is sensitive from non-
sensitive. Disassociation lies under this category of
bucketization techniques, preserves utility by keeping
the values intact without any alteration, but it does not
divide the attributes into sensitive and non-sensitive.
Dwork defined the notion of differential privacy
(Dwork et al., 2006) to handle private data publishing
efficiently. It gained much popularity among com-
puter scientists providing strong assumptions on the
way that data should be released. It is based on a
strong mathematical foundation and guarantees that
an attacker will not be able to learn any information
about an individual that he/she already knows if the
individual is removed from the dataset. In order to
achieve differential privacy, approaches tend to re-
lease privatized data by introducing noise to query re-
sults. Here, despite the efficiency provided by differ-
ential privacy, we opt for disassociation since it pub-
lishes truthful datasets.
Yeye et al. (He and Naughton, 2009) extended
k-anonymity to set-valued context, in which there is
no distinction between quasi-identifying, sensitive or
non-sensitive values. In their approach, the authors
generate a k-anonymous dataset via a top-down par-
titioning privacy technique based on local generaliza-
tion. In a similar approach, the authors in (Fard and
Wang, 2010) adopted the k-anonymity privacy con-
straint for a transactional dataset. They proposed a
clustering based technique to group similar transac-
tions into clusters, in order to reduce generalizations
and suppression thus reducing information loss. A
common problem with these methods is that a large
part of the initial items are usually missing from the
anonymized data due to generalization or suppres-
sion. In (Jia et al., 2014), the authors propose a pri-
vacy notion ρ-uncertainty to ensure that there are no
sensitive association rules that can be inferred with
confidence higher than ρ. Truthful association rules
however can still be derived, but this requires, in a
similar manner to bucketization techniques, distinc-
tion between the sensitive and non-sensitive values.
Preserving privacy by disassociation is a promis-
ing technique in which the values are kept intact with-
out any alteration: neither generalization nor suppres-
sion. It thus falls under the general category of bucke-
tization techniques but again, without the need to dis-
tinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive values.
Attacks on anonymization focus on the identi-
fication of sensitive information, information that is
meant to be private, by either exploiting defects in
the privacy constraints, a bug in the mechanism that
implements it or even by assuming knowledge of the
underlying anonymization algorithm such as the min-
imality attack (Cormode et al., 2010; Wong et al.,
2007).
We discuss here some of the interesting attacks that
have been reported in the data anonymization liter-
ature. Homogeneity attack (Samarati, 2001) is con-
sidered successful when there is a lack of diversity
among the values of the sensitive attribute. Back-
ground knowledge (Machanavajjhala et al., 2006)
attack compromises anonymization, when the at-
tacker’s background knowledge includes information
about the sensitive values of a specific individual
or partial knowledge of the distribution of sensitive
and non-sensitive values. Unsorted matching attack
(Sweeney, 2001) is related to the order in which the
tuples appear in the released table that can leak sen-
sitive information if it is preserved in the anonymized
dataset.
The attacks mentioned previously present some in-
sights on the privacy problems that might be encoun-
tered when anonymizing sensitive information in an
outsourcing scenario. To the best of our knowledge,
none has explored the privacy breach in a disassoci-
ated dataset. In this paper, we highlight and evaluate
the ability of an attacker to link his/her partial back-
ground knowledge represented by the m items that
he/she is allowed to have, according to the privacy
constraint km-anonymity, to less than k records. The
works described in (Wong et al., 2011; Ressel, 1985)
are good examples of attacks that follow the same
convention by identifying flaws in the anonymization
techniques allowing attackers to use their background
knowledge to breach privacy or extract foreground
knowledge. The authors assume that the correlation
between the values in an anonymized dataset could be
used to breach the privacy of the anonymization tech-
niques that use l-diversity in their underlying privacy
mechanism.
3 Preserving Privacy by Disassociation
3.1 Formalization
Let D = {x1, ...,xd} be a set of items (e.g., supermar-
ket products, query logs, or search keywords). Any
subset I ⊆ D is an itemset (e.g., items searched to-
gether). Let T = (r1, ...,rn) be a dataset of records,
where ri ⊆ D for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a record in T and ri is
associated with a specific individual of a population.
We use [ri]m to denote the set of all m-combinations of
the record ri. Equivalently, [ri]m is the set of m items
subsets of ri. Note that D is no more than the set of
items in T : D =
⋃n
i=1 ri.
We use RT to define a subset of records in T . s(T )
and s(RT ) denote the numbers of records in T and RT
respectively and thus, s(I,T ) denotes the number of
Table 1: Notations
T a table containing individuals related records
r a record of T ; set of items associated with a specific indi-
vidual of a population
[ri ]m a set of all m-combinations of items in the record ri
I an itemset of D that might or not be grouped together in a
record of T
RT a set of records in T grouped as a cluster
s(I,T ) the number of records in T that contain I
T ∗ a table anonymized using the disassociation technique
C a chunk in a disassociated dataset; is a set of sub-records of
T in T ∗
CT an item chunk in a disassociated; dataset a quasi-identifier
group
RC a record chunk; is a set of sub-records of R in T ∗
B the background knowledge of an attacker
records in T that contain I.
Table 1 defines the basic concepts and notations
used in the paper.
3.2 Disassociation
Disassociation works under the assumption that the
items should neither be altered, suppressed, nor gen-
eralized, but at the same time the dataset should serve
the km-anonymity privacy constraint (Terrovitis et al.,
2008). km-anonymity guarantees that an attacker who
knows up to m items, grouped together in an itemset
I ⊆D , cannot associate them with less than k records
from T , where k ≥ 2 is a user-defined constant. For-
mally, km-anonymity is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (km-anonymity). Given a dataset of
records T whose items belong to a given set of items
D , we say that T is km-anonymous if ∀I ⊆ D and
|I| ≤ m, the number of records that contain I in T is
greater than or equal to k, s(I,T )≥ k.
In a practical scenario, km-anonymity cannot
be achieved without a severe loss in data utility.
The disassociation technique (Terrovitis et al., 2012;
Loukides et al., 2014b), for its part, ensures privacy
through bucketization to provide better utility when it
comes for frequent itemsets discovery and aggregate
analysis.
Disassociation separates the dataset into clusters
of km-anonymous record chunks and an item chunk.
The key idea is to sort records based on the most
frequent items and then group them horizontally into
smaller disjoint clusters {R1, ...,Rn}. It partitions, in
a next step, the clusters vertically into km-anonymous
record chunks {C1, ...,Cn} and an item chunk CT to
hide infrequent combinations. The record chunks are
created subsequently as long as there are items that
can be grouped together in a way to satisfy the km-
anonymity privacy constraint. The remaining items,
the ones that occur less that k times, are moved to the
item chunk CT .2
Formally, given a dataset T , applying disassoci-
ation on T will produce an anonymized dataset T ∗
composed of n clusters where each is divided into a
2The shared chunk as defined in the original paper (Ter-
rovitis et al., 2012) is omitted here for simplicity.
set of record chunks and an item chunk,
T ∗=({R1C1 , ...,R1Ct ,R1CT }, ...,{RnC1 , ...,RnCt ,RnCT })
such that ∀RiCj ∈ T ∗, RiCj is km-anonymous, where,
• RiCj represents the itemsets of the ith cluster that
are contained in the record chunk C j.
• RiCT is the item chunk of the ith cluster containing
items that occur less than k times.
The example in Figure 1b shows that the disasso-
ciated dataset contains only one cluster with two km-
anonymous record chunks (k=3 and m=2) and an item
chunk, thus, T ∗=({R1C1 ,R1C2 ,R1CT }).
In a disassociated dataset, privacy is preserved by
assuming that the record chunks are km-anonymous
and that the records that are not km-anonymous in the
original dataset, are km-anonymous in at least one of
the datasets resulting from the inverse transformation
of the disassociated dataset. This privacy guarantee is
formally expressed as follows:
Definition 2 (Disassociation Guarantee). Let G be
the inverse transformation of T ∗. G takes an
anonymized dataset G(T ∗) and outputs the set of
all possible datasets {T ′}. ∀I ⊆ D , |I| ≤ m, ∃T ′ ∈
G(T ∗) where s(I,T ′)≥ k.
The Disassociation Guarantee ensures that for any
individual with a complete record r, and for an at-
tacker who knows up to m items of r, at least one of
the datasets reconstructed by the inverse transforma-
tion has r hidden by repeating its existence k times.
That is, given m items of r, if r exists less than
k times in the original dataset, the attacker will not
be able to link back the record to the individual with
a probability greater than 1/k in the disassociated
dataset. This record r, as all other records, exists in
at least one of the inverse transformations k times.
4 Attacker Model
In accordance with the work in (Terrovitis et al., 2012;
Loukides et al., 2014b; Terrovitis et al., 2008), we
consider that the attacker intends to link individuals to
their anonymized records (e.g., complete set of search
logs or purchased supermarket products). This can
be done, in a trivial anonymization, by tracing unique
combinations of items. For example, an attacker who
knows that Alice has searched for side effects and
vomiting is represented by a background knowledge
set of items {Side Effects, Vomiting}. Since one and
only one such record exists in the dataset of Figure 1a,
the attacker can easily link this record back to Alice.
In addition, we assume that the attacker has knowl-
edge of the disassociation technique.
We also assume that the attacker may have back-
ground knowledge consisting of at most m items;
knowing these m items, he/she will not be able to link
them to less than k records in the dataset (i.e., adopt-
ing km-anonymity, the same privacy guarantee as in
(Terrovitis et al., 2012)). Some models add to it neg-
ative background knowledge (e.g., the attacker knows
that an individual has not posed a specific query, that
an item is not purchased by a given individual, etc.).
Again, as in (Terrovitis et al., 2012) and many other
bucketization techniques (Xiao and Tao, 2006) (Li
et al., 2012), we do not assume this kind of nega-
tion knowledge. Here, we classify attackers into three
categories: strong, moderate, and weak, depending
on their level of background knowledge and conse-
quently their ability to associate individuals with their
records in T .
Strong attackers have a background knowledge
B = {I1, ..., In} such that ∀Ii ∈ B , Ii is of size
m, |Ii| = m and well picked3 from the set of m-
combinations [ri]m of a record ri, Ii ∈ [ri]m. For
these attackers, as shown in Figure 2a, there ex-
ists a bijective function that links itemsets in B to
records in T .
Moderate attackers have a background knowledge
B = {I1, ..., Iz}, z< n such that ∀Ii ∈B , Ii is of size
m, |Ii|=m and chosen at random from a strict sub-
set I−v of the m-combinations [rv]m of a record rv,
Ii ∈ I−v |I−v ⊂ [rv]m. For these attackers, as shown
in Figure 2b, there exists a one-to-one injective
function that links itemsets in B to records in T .
Weak attackers have a background knowledge B =
{I1, ..., Iz}, z< n such that ∀Ii ∈ B , Ii is of size m,
|Ii|= m and chosen at random from a set of asso-
ciation rules and frequent itemsets I , Ii ∈ I, that
are not necessarily in D . The goal of weak at-
tackers is limited to reconstruct the disassociated
dataset to its original form but they are unable to
link records to individuals (see Figure 2c).
5 Privacy Evaluation in a Disassociated
Dataset
In this section, we define the cover problem and we
demonstrate its repercussion on data privacy. More
specifically, we evaluate the privacy breach that might
occur in a disassociated dataset due to the cover prob-
lem.
5.1 Cover Problem
A cover problem is defined by the ability to associate
one-to-one or one-to-many items in two subsequent
record chunks in the disassociated data. The target
item from the first chunk has equal or higher support
and we call it the covered item. Formally the cover
problem is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Cover Problem). Given a set of items
in RiCj−1 ( j ≥ 2) that have a support greater than or
equal to the support of an item xi, j ∈ RiCj , Ii, j−1 =
3More details on how these itemsets are picked will be
provided in the experiments section
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(c) Weak attackers
Figure 2: Associations between the background knowledge of attackers based on their category and the records in T
{y : y ∈ RiCj−1 and s(y,RiCj−1 )≥ s(xi, j,RiCj )}, we say
that a cover problem exists if ∃yi, j−1 ∈ Ii, j−1 such that
s(yi, j−1,RiCj−1 )
= s(Ii, j−1,RiCj−1 ) = min∀y∈Ii, j−1
s(y,RiCj−1 ).
To give an example of the cover problem, consider
Figure 3a. The set of items in the previous record
chunk R1C1 having support greater than or equal to e
is I1,1 = {a,b,c}. The support of the itemset I1,1 in
R1C1 , which is s(I1,1,R1C1 ), is equal to 2. In turn, it
is equal to the minimum support of the values in I1,1,
which, in our example, is s(c,R1C1 ). Therefore we say
that the item c is covered by the items a and b.
Another example can be extracted from Figure 1b,
the item Cancer in I1 is covered by the remainder of
the items in I1. In fact, all of the occurrences of the
item Cancer are associated with the items Treatment
and Oncologist and therefore, by associating the item
Side Effects with Cancer, Side Effects will eventually
be linked to both Treatment and Oncologist.
5.2 Privacy Breach
Recall from Subsection 3.2 and Definition 2, that
the disassociation technique hides infrequent records;
records that occur less than k times in the original
dataset for a given m items, by 1) dividing them into
k-anonymous sub-records in record chunks and 2) en-
suring that all the records reconstructed by the inverse
transformation are km-anonymous in at least one of
the resulting datasets.
Intuitively, a privacy breach occurs if an attacker
is able to link m items, which he/she already knows
about an individual, to less than k records in all the
datasets reconstructed by the inverse transformation.
More subtle is when these records contain the same
set of items in all the reconstructed datasets thus, link-
ing more than m items to the individual or worse lead-
ing to a complete de-anonymization; linking, with
certainty, the complete set of items to the individual.
(Figure 3c is an example of such a de-anonymization.
The attacker already knows that an individual has
searched for items e and c and thus can relate him/her
them to the same items a and b in all the reconstructed
datasets).
We will show in the following that this privacy
breach might occur whenever the dataset is subject to
a cover problem. Formally speaking:
Lemma 1. Let T ∗ be a disassociated dataset subject
to a cover problem and involving an item xi, j ∈ RiCj
and a covered item yi, j−1 ∈ RiCj−1 . We say that a pri-
vacy breach might occur if {xi, j, yi, j−1} ⊆ I where
I ∈ B , the attacker’s background knowledge.
We show in what follows that an attacker is able
to breach the privacy provided by the disassociation
technique, if his/her background knowledge contains
the items involved in the association that led to the
cover problem.
Proof. The dataset T ∗ is subject to a cover problem
and therefore, there exists an item xi, j ∈ RiCj ( j ≥ 2)
that can be associated with a covered item yi, j−1 ∈
Ii, j−1 where Ii, j−1 = {y : y ∈ RiCj−1 and s(y,RiCj−1 ) ≥
s(xi, j,RiCj )} is the set of items in RiCj−1 having sup-
port greater than or equal to the support of xi, j.
Let us assume that the items xi, j and yi, j−1 are as-
sociated together in k records in at least one of the
datasets reconstructed by the inverse transformation
of T ∗. Since yi, j−1 is a covered item, xi, j will also be
associated k times with all the items covering yi, j−1
in Ii, j−1 . While this is correct from a privacy per-
spective, it cannot be considered for disassociation.
In fact, these items, xi, j, yi, j−1 and the covering items
in Ii, j−1 are considered k-anonymous and therefore
should have been allot to the record chunk RiCj−1 ac-
cording to disassociation4.
Now, if the attacker’s background knowledge B
consists of itemsets of size m and there exists an item-
set I that contains both xi, j and yi, j−1, {xi, j, yi, j−1}
⊆ I, a privacy breach will occur. In fact, these m items
will never be associated together in k records in any
of the datasets reconstructed by the inverse transfor-
mation of T ∗.
Figure 3b describes six possible datasets, T ′1 ,
...,T ′6 , reconstructed by the inverse transformation of
the disassociated dataset shown in Figure 3a. In this
example, only five datasets T ′1 , ..., T
′
5 are valid ones.
4Vertical partitioning, creation of record chunks, pre-
serves k-anonymous itemsets in the same record chunks.
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Figure 3: Cover problem and privacy breach examples
T ′6 is omitted due to the cover problem and the knowl-
edge of the disassociation algorithm. Given that the
item e is associated with the covered item c is k = 2
times, consequently e is associated with a and b in k
records and thus, according to the disassociation tech-
nique, the item e should have remained in the first
record chunk R1C1 .
If the attacker’s background knowledge contains
the items c and b, he/she will be able to link every
record containing c and b to less than k records in the
record chunk, thus breaching the privacy of disasso-
ciation (see Figure 3c).
This privacy breach is also detected in the ex-
ample of Figure 1b. The item Cancer in R1C1 ,
is one of the least frequent items in the set of
items having support greater than or equal to the
item Side Effects in the record chunk R1C2 , I1 ={Oncologist, Cancer, Treatment}. Cancer is covered
by the remainder of the items in I1. If Side Effects
is associated with Cancer in k records, Side Effects
will be associated with Treatment and Oncologist in
k records or alternatively saying that the itemset {
Side Effects, Cancer, Treatment and Oncologist } is
k-anonymous. As a consequence, according to the
disassociation technique, these items should have be-
longed to the same record chunk which does not cor-
respond to the disassociated dataset of Figure 1b.
5.3 Quantitative Privacy Breach Detection Algo-
rithm
We present, in the following, the quantitative pri-
vacy breach detection algorithm to evaluate the pri-
vacy breach in a disassociated dataset based on the
cover problems. The algorithm takes a disassociated
dataset T ∗, and the attacker’s background knowledge
B that includes itemsets of size m and evaluates the
privacy breach represented by the number of vulnera-
ble records in the disassociated dataset T ∗. It iterates,
in Step 3, over each cluster Ri in T ∗ in an ascending
order to evaluate, for each item xi, j in record chunk
RiCj , the number of privacy breaches in all the pre-
vious record chunks. To do so, the algorithm 1) re-
trieves in Step 10 the itemset Ii,l of items having sup-
port greater than or equal to the support of xi, j and
2) verifies in Step 11 whether xi, j and any item y in
Ii,l is subject to a cover problem. A privacy breach
is noted if both items xi, j and y are included in any of
the itemsets I of the attackers’ background knowledge
B . The algorithm returns the total number of vulner-
able records that is computed based on the sum of the
maximum number of privacy breaches determined per
item.
Algorithm 1 Quantitative Privacy Breach Detection
algorithm
Require: T ∗,B
Ensure: total
1: max← 0;
2: total← 0;
3: for each Ri ∈ T ∗ do
4: get j, the number of record chunks in Ri;
5: for each RiCj ∈ Ri do
6: breach← 0;
7: l← j−1;
8: for each item xi, j ∈ RiCj do
9: while (l ≥ 0) do
10: get Ii,l ;
/**Ii,l = {y : y ∈ RiCl and s(y,RiCl )≥ s(xi, j,RiCj )}*/
11: if s(Ii,l ,RiCl ) = min∀y∈Ii,l
s(y,RiCl ) and
{yi,l ,xi, j} ⊆ I then
/**I ∈ B*/
12: breach++;
13: end if
14: l−−;
15: end while
16: end for
17: if breach> max then
18: max← breach;
19: end if
20: end for
21: total← total+max;
22: end for
23: return total;
Although the proposed algorithm covers a broader
aspect of the privacy breach by estimating the number
of records that are vulnerable due to the cover prob-
lem, it can be extended to provide better insights on
how many records are de-anonymized; linked to the
individual with certainty. In fact, as discussed in Sub-
section 5.2, a privacy breach is found not only when
completely de-anonymizing a record but also when an
attacker is able to link more than m items to the indi-
vidual. This is noted in the algorithm every time the
items involved in the association that led to the cover
problem are part of the attacker’s knowledge.
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Figure 4: Privacy breach and performance evaluations
6 Experiments
We conducted a series of experiments on real datasets
described in Table 2, the click-stream data, BMS-
WebView-1 and BMS-WebView-2, and the AOL
search query logs. We implemented all methods in
JAVA and performed the experiments on an Intel Core
i7-4702MQ CPU at 2.2GHz with 8GB of RAM. The
goal of these experiments is to:
• Evaluate the privacy breach represented by the
number of vulnerable records using the quanti-
tative privacy breach detection algorithm on the
aforementioned datasets with various attackers:
strong, moderate, and weak,
• Evaluate the performance of the quantitative pri-
vacy breach detection algorithm.
Dataset # of distinct individuals # of distinct items
AOL 65517 1216655
BMS-WebView-1 59602 497
BMS-WebView-2 77512 3340
Table 2: Datasets properties
The tests were performed using three types of at-
tackers, strong, moderate and weak, where each of
which has a background knowledge simulated as fol-
lows:
Strong attacker : the background knowledge of this
attacker consists of itemsets of size 2 (m = 2)
picked from the 2-combinations of each and every
record in the dataset. Since it is a strong attacker,
we assume that these itemsets contain the items
that are involved in the association that will lead
to a cover problem (i.e., well picked). Therefore, a
privacy breach occurs whenever a cover problem
is found.
Moderate attacker : the background knowledge of
this attacker consists of itemsets of size 2 (m= 2)
chosen at random from the 2-combinations of a
strict subset of D (records in T ).
Weak attacker : to simulate the background knowl-
edge of this attacker, we have chosen at random
10 items from the dataset (for each test) and an-
other 10 items from wordnet (Miller, 1995) and
generated their 2-combinations. This gave us a
background knowledge B of size 190.
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Figure 5: Quantitative privacy breach detection algorithm
performance evaluation
Privacy Breach Evaluation In this test, we evalu-
ate the privacy breach caused by the cover problem
using the quantitative privacy breach detection algo-
rithm. Three test cases were studied. In each of the
test cases, the algorithm evaluates the aforementioned
datasets by varying the maximum cluster size with
fixed k = 3, m = 2 according to the attacker’s back-
ground knowledge. The results are shown in Figure
4. It is not surprising that for strong attackers the
privacy breach is most explicit. In fact, strong at-
tackers’ background knowledge, consisting of all the
itemsets of size m = 2, are linked to each of the in-
dividuals in the dataset. Therefore, whenever a cover
problem is found, a privacy breach is noted. In ad-
dition, we can notice that for the strong attacker as
exhibited in the three datasets, the privacy breach in-
creases linearly with the cluster size. Larger clusters
include more cover problems and thus more privacy
breaches. This is not reflected by moderate and weak
attackers. These attackers have background knowl-
edge generated from a strict subset of randomly cho-
sen items from the dataset and other items from exter-
nal sources. Moreover and unlike the strong attack-
ers’ background knowledge, moderate and weak at-
tackers’ background knowledge are linked to a subset
of records in the datasets. This fact justifies the low
number of violations found in the dataset for these at-
tackers.
Performance Evaluation Here, we evaluate the
performance of the quantitative privacy breach detec-
tion algorithm on the BMS-WebView-1 dataset for
the three types of attackers; strong, moderate and
weak. The results shown in Figure 5 demonstrate that
the algorithm performs in a generally stable fashion
when increasing the cluster size. The best perfor-
mance is obtained when dealing with strong attackers.
The algorithm treats every cover problem as a privacy
breach and therefore, unlike for moderate and weak
attackers, there is no need to search for the items that
are involved in the association that led to a cover prob-
lem in the background knowledge of the attackers.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a formal model of
the set-valued data and the disassociation technique.
The cover problem has been defined, while its effects
on the disassociation of the dataset has been regarded.
Such investigations have led to the quantitative pri-
vacy breach detection algorithm, whose efficiency has
been studied. By this way, we have shown in what ex-
tent a disassociated dataset can be vulnerable. In the
near future, we intend to develop partial suppression
in disassociated dataset and evaluate the gain in utility
that the disassociation provides.
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